| 내용 |
1 Introduction 9 -- 2 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 15 -- 2.1 Chapter Preview 15 -- 2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 15 -- 2.3 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 16 -- 2.4 Stresses Faced by Current U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 19 -- 3 Motivation for Current Study 21 -- 3.1 Chapter Preview 21 -- 3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed -- Wholesale Power Markets 21 -- 3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 21 -- 3.2.2 Problematic Use of Hedonic Pricing 22 -- 3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 23 -- 3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 24 -- 3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 26 -- 3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 27 -- 3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 28 -- 3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 30 -- 3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 30 -- 4 Swing Contracts for ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 33 -- 4.1 Swing Contract Overview 33 -- 4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 33 -- 4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 35 -- 5 Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 37 -- 5.1 Chapter Preview 37 -- 5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 38 -- 5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 42 -- 3 -- 4 Contents -- 5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 43 -- 5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in -- Power and Ramp 48 -- 5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 50 -- 5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52 -- 6 Swing-Contract Market Design 55 -- 6.1 Chapter Preview 55 -- 6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55 -- 6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 57 -- 6.4 Reserve Bids 58 -- 6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 59 -- 6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60 -- 6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61.
7 Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case MILP Formulation 65 -- 7.1 Chapter Preview 65 -- 7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 66 -- 7.3 Discretization of the ISO's Optimization Problem 67 -- 7.4 ISO Objective Function 71 -- 7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 72 -- 7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 74 -- 7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 76 -- 7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 79 -- 8 Inclusion of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 83 -- 8.1 Chapter Preview 83 -- 8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 83 -- 8.3 MILP Tractable Form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 85 -- 9 Inclusion of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 91 -- 9.1 Chapter Preview 91 -- 9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 92 -- 9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 94 -- 9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 94 -- 9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 95 -- 9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 95 -- 9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 97 -- 9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 98 -- 10 The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 101 -- 10.1 Chapter Preview 101 -- 10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 102 -- 10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract Markets 105 -- 10.4 Swing-Contract Long-Term Forward Markets 106 -- 10.5 Swing-Contract Short-Term Forward Markets 107 -- Contents 5 -- 10.6 Swing-Contract Very Short-Term Forward Markets 109 -- 10.7 Swing-Contract Deployment in Real-Time Operations 110 -- 11 Illustration: Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract -- Markets 113 -- 11.1 Chapter Preview 113 -- 11.2 Hour-Ahead Market with Reserve Offers Consisting of -- Swing-Contract Portfolios 114 -- 11.3 SCED Solution for Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Market 117 -- 11.3.1 Overview 117 -- 11.3.2 Power Balance 117 -- 11.3.3 Coverage of the ISO's Uncertainty Set 119 -- 11.3.4 Constrained Minimization of Expected Cost 121 -- 11.4 Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Markets 121 -- 12 Standard Modeling of a Competitive Market 125.
12.1 Chapter Preview 125 -- 12.2 Key Definitions 125 -- 12.3 Standard Competitive Market Assumptions 126 -- 12.4 Law of One Price for Commodities 126 -- 12.5 Competitive Market: Basic Formulation 127 -- 12.6 Net Surplus Extraction 130 -- 12.7 Market Efficiency Metric 131 -- 12.8 Market Efficiency and Pricing Rules 133 -- 12.9 Strategic Trade Behavior and Trader Market Power 134 -- 13 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets: Efficiency and Market Power 137 -- 13.1 Chapter Preview 137 -- 13.2 Daily Market Operations 137 -- 13.3 Illustrative Analytical DAM Formulation 140 -- 13.4 Net Surplus Extraction in the Illustrative DAM 141 -- 13.5 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-I Error 145 -- 13.6 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-II Error 149 -- 13.7 Market Inefficiency in the Illustrative DAM. 153 -- 13.8 DAM Performance: General Assessment 156 -- 13.9 Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts 158 -- 14 Comparisons with Swing-Contract Markets 161 -- 14.1 Chapter Preview 161 -- 14.2 Product Definition in U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 162 -- 14.3 Wholesale Power and the Law of One Price (Not) 164 -- 14.4 Differential vs. Uniform Pricing 165 -- 14.5 Comparison of SC and Current U.S. DAM Designs 166 -- 6 Contents -- 15 Advantages of the Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 169 -- 15.1 Chapter Preview 169 -- 15.2 SC Markets are Physically-Covered Insurance Markets 170 -- 15.3 Longer-Term SC Markets Support New Investment 171 -- 15.4 SC Markets Ensure Revenue Sufficiency 176 -- 15.5 SC Markets Ameliorate Merit-Order Concerns 177 -- 15.6 SC Markets are Robust-Control Mechanisms 178 -- 15.7 SC Markets Reduce Rule Complexity 179 -- 15.8 SC Markets Reduce Gaming Opportunities 180 -- 15.9 SC Markets Have Smaller-Sized Optimizations 182 -- 15.10 Additional Advantages of SC Markets 183 -- 15.10.1 Ensure a Level Playing Field for Resource Participation 183 -- 15.10.2 Permit Co-Optimization of Diverse Reserve 184 -- 15.10.3 Appropriately Remunerate Diversity and Flexibility 184 -- 15.10.4 Encourage Accurate Forecasting and Dispatch Following 184.
15.10.5 Ensure Settlement Time-Consistency 184 -- 16 Gradual Transmission to Linked Swing-Contract Markets 185 -- 16.1 Chapter Preview 185 -- 16.2 A DAM Formulation Permitting Gradual Transition 187 -- 16.3 Cost Function Preliminaries for the Transitional DAM189 -- 16.4 MILP SCUC/SCED Optimization for the Transitional DAM 192 -- 17 Swing-Contract Support for Integrated Transmission and -- Distribution Systems 201 -- 17.1 Chapter Preview 201 -- 17.2 Transactive Energy System Design for ITD Systems 203 -- 17.3 Role of Distribution Utilities 207 -- 17.4 An IDSO-Managed Bid-Based TES Design for Households 208 -- 17.5 IDSOs as Grid-Edge Resource Aggregators 211 -- 17.6 Swing-Contract Support for IDSO Participation in Wholesale -- Power Markets 212 -- 18 Design Evaluation via the ITD TES Platform 213 -- 18.1 Chapter Preview 213 -- 18.2 Design Readiness Levels 213 -- 18.3 An ITD TES Platform Permitting TES Design Evaluation 216 -- 18.4 Illustrative Test Cases: Overview218 -- 18.5 Illustrative Test Cases: Report 221 -- 19 Potential Future Research Directions 227 -- 20 Conclusion: The Dots Keep Connecting 231 -- Contents 7 -- 21 Appendices 233 -- 21.1 Quick-Reference Glossary of Standard Acronyms 233 -- 21.2 Quick-Reference Glossary of Transmission System Terms 234 -- 21.3 Quick-Reference Glossary of Economic Terms 235 -- 21.4 Nomenclature for a Swing-Contract Market 236 -- 21.5 Nomenclature for a Distribution System 238 -- References 239.
|
