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Levels of psychological explanation and the interface problem -- Explanation at different levels -- Personal and subpersonal levels of explanation -- Horizontal explanation, vertical explanation, and commonsense psychology -- the interface problem and four pictures of the mind -- The nature of commonsense psychology: the autonomous mind and the functional mind -- The autonomous mind and commonsense psychology -- The autonomous mind and the interface problem -- The functional mind -- Philosophical functionalism and psychological functionalism -- Psychological functionalism and the interface problem -- Causes in the mind : from the functional mind to the -- Representational mind -- Causation by content : problems with the functional mind -- The representational mind and the language of thought -- The mind as a computer -- Neural networks and the neurocomputational mind -- Top-down explanation vs. the co-evolutionary research strategy -- Cognition, co-evolution, and the brain -- Neural network models -- Neural network modelling and the co-evolutionary research paradigm : the example of language -- Rationality, mental causation and commonsense psychology -- Real patterns without real causes -- How anomalous is the mental? -- The counterfactual approach -- The scope of commonsense psychology -- Thinking about the scope of commonsense psychology -- Implicit and explicit commonsense psychology : the broad construal -- Modest revisionism : the simulationist proposal -- Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (1) -- Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (2) -- Emotion perception in social interactions -- The indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma -- 6.5.3. frames and routines -- A suggestion? -- From perception to action -- From perception to action : the standard view -- Cognitive architecture and the standard view -- The distinction between perception and cognition -- Domain-specific reasoning and the massive modularity hypothesis -- Propositional attitudes : contents and vehicle -- Another look at the interface problem -- The argument for structure -- The problem of structure in artificial neural networks -- Rejecting the structure requirement -- Finding structure in artificial neural networks -- Words and thoughts -- Thinking in words (1) : the inner speech hypothesis -- Thinking in words (2) : the rewiring hypothesis -- The state of play -- Practical reasoning and the language of thought -- Perceptual integration -- Concept learning.
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