| 청구기호 |
HB144 .C53 1997 |
| 형태사항 |
xv, 362 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
|
| 언어 |
English |
| 서지주기 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
|
| 내용 |
Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. Pt. 1. The basic model ; Pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; Pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.
|
| 주제 |
Game theory.
Economics, Mathematical.
|
| LCCN |
96020693
|
| ISBN |
0691011931 (cloth : alk. paper)
0691011923 (pbk. : alk. paper)
|
