The motivations of stock repurchase programs have received great attention both from financial economists and practitioners. Stock repurchase activity represents one branch of dividend policy, which is the practice of redistributing the firm's earnings to its shareholders. Existing shareholders of repurchasing firms gain premiums from stock repurchase, and the ownership structure of the firm also changes. This structural characteristic of stock repurchases has raised important issues regarding corporate governance. Firms may repurchase their own stock not only to distribute wealth to shareholders but also to gain control of the firm. Extant empirical studies show conflicting results on this issue depending on the legal system of the economy.
In this study by analyzing the dividend policies of Japanese firms, we explore the determinants of stock repurchase program announcements of firms listed in the 1st and 2nd section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find that ultimate owners of firms with large deviation between cash flow rights and voting rights announce stock repurchases more aggressively. It appears that incumbent management teams are wary of the fact that they can become hostile takeover targets. Extending Bagwell’s (1991) argument, we interpret that firms with large deviation between cash flow rights and voting rights are likely to announce large amounts of stock repurchase in order to increase both the cost of gaining a toehold and the price of the offer. We also find that the actual repurchasing behavior is not determined by its affiliation to the Keiretsu, but its degree of deviation between cash flow rights and voting rights. Keiretsu affiliate firms are most aggressive in repurchasing its own shares when their cash flow rights are voting rights are far off alignment. Consistent with the findings of Claessens et. al (2000), we find that firms with low deviation between cash flow rights and voting rights return more cash dividends to shareholders to distribute earnings.
자사주매입의 결정요인에 대한 연구는 다양하게 이루어지고 있다. 자사주매입은 배당정책의 한 종류이며, 기업의 이익을 주주에게 배분하는 방법의 일종이다. 현금배당의 경우, 단순히 주주들에게 현금을 지불하는 선에서 끝나지만, 자사주매입의 경우, 소유구조가 변한다. 이러한 구조적인 측면 때문에 자사주매입에 관한 기업지배구조적인 문제가 제기되어 왔다. 기업은 주주에게 부를 배분하는 의도 외에도 경영자의 지분을 증가시켜 경영권을 강화하는 수단으로도 사용될 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 일본의 도쿄증권거래소에 상장된 기업들을 대상으로 자사주매입의 결정요인을 살펴본다.
본 연구 결과에 따르면, 현금권리(cash flow right)와 의결권(voting right)사이의 괴리가 큰 기업일수록 많은 양의 자사주매입을 공고하는 것으로 나타난다. 이렇게 현금권리(cash flow right)와 의결권(voting right)사이의 괴리가 큰 기업의 경영자는 경영권 방어의 수단으로 자사주매입을 현금배당과 병행한다고 볼 수 있다. 또한 일본의 기업단체인 Keiretsu 로 소속된 기업일수록, 이러한 소액주주권리침해가 빈번히 드러난다.
