The interconnection standards between the mobile and the fixed telecommunications carrier are much more important than their meanings themselves because their regulatory takings and givings influence their own revenues reciprocally. The regulatory standards effectively influence all the profits and costs in the telecommuncations supply market and divide them to the business participants as for the contributions shown at the regulatory articles. This paper starts from the irrelevant situations where the customer access networks are provided at a deficit price nothing more than facilitator supporting new entrants. This extraordinary pricing mechanism means that the transfer of the profits and costs between the interconnecting carriers prevail and then would cause ‘market failure’ unintentionally. The highest priority to set up on the access standards insisted here is the solving the maladjusted deficit problems in the customer access parts of fixed line carrier. For this diagnosis and therapy I referred many other countries’ cases and the advancing LRIC logics as well as current FDC in domestic regulation schemes. Through the nationally specific studies I found no case where the incumbent deficit is presumed. Especially JAPAN and UK are introducing LRIC adventurously under the no NTS deficit circumstances but are reportedly showing the half cut reductions of their share values. In the long-term view the fixed services will be replaced by the mobile customer services but it means not at the network level configurations. The value is not always on the customers, which statement is represented in the ‘network externality’ contents here. The latter part of this paper focuses some critical issues to be considered and finely tuned : common costs, depreciations, NTS/TS etc. and also suggested some ideas of a predictable and economically incentive-providing standards for interconnection telecommunications market.
