서지주요정보
(A) game-theoretic decision-making model with probabilistic payoffs in vehicle interactions = 차량의 상호작용 시 확률적 보상을 고려한 게임이론적 의사결정 모형
서명 / 저자 (A) game-theoretic decision-making model with probabilistic payoffs in vehicle interactions = 차량의 상호작용 시 확률적 보상을 고려한 게임이론적 의사결정 모형 / Eunjeong Ko.
발행사항 [대전 : 한국과학기술원, 2024].
Online Access 원문보기 원문인쇄

소장정보

등록번호

8043049

소장위치/청구기호

학술문화관(도서관)2층 학위논문

DGT 24004

휴대폰 전송

도서상태

이용가능(대출불가)

사유안내

반납예정일

리뷰정보

초록정보

While traveling on the road, vehicles often encounter sections where different traffic streams converge due to the geometric design of the roadway. These sections require quick decision-making to ensure smooth driving, making vehicle interactions inevitable, which can lead to safety issues. Therefore, it is important to identify in advance the sections where mandatory lane-changing occurs and to understand the decision-making of the vehicles clearly. This study examines two representative sections where mandatory lane-changing occurs, namely merging sections and roundabouts, and proposes a game-theoretic model to determine the vehicle’s strategy by considering probabilistic payoffs. To this end, this study defined the payoff for decisions as the minimization of travel time or passing time and formalizes the game through a payoff function and matrix. A feasible numerical range is then defined to calculate the probabilities of various driving states on the road, and each equilibrium is evaluated for each situation. Finally, an empirical analysis was performed using large-scale aerial image-based trajectory data, and the predicted results were compared with actual decisions. The model verification showed that the predicted results were highly accurate compared to actual decisions. This study provides a micro-level exploration of lane-changing behavior, allowing for a realistic understanding of decision-making.

도로를 주행하는 동안 차량은 다양한 기하구조 상에서 서로 다른 교통류가 하나로 합쳐지는 구간을 빈번하게 직면한다. 이러한 구간에서는 짧은 시간 내에 원활한 주행을 보장하기 위한 결정이 필요하므로 차량 간에 불가피한 상호작용이 발생하게 되며, 이로 인한 안전 문제가 야기될 수 있다. 따라서, 필수적인 차로변경이 발생하는 구간을 사전에 파악하고 구간을 주행하는 차량의 의사결정을 명확하게 이해하는 것은 중요하다. 이에 본 연구는 대표적인 두 구간인 합류부와 회전 교차로를 살펴보고 확률적인 보상을 고려하여 차량의 의사결정을 위한 게임이론적 모델을 제안하는 것을 목표로 하였다. 이를 위해 선택에 대한 보상을 통행시간 및 통과시간 최소화로 정의하고 보수 함수와 행렬을 통해 게임을 공식화하였다. 다음으로, 다양한 주행 상태에 따른 차량의 선택 확률을 계산하기 위해 실현 가능한 수치적인 주행 범위를 정의하고 적절한 균형을 평가하였다. 마지막으로, 대규모 항공 궤적 자료를 활용한 실증 분석을 수행하고 예측 결과를 실제 선택과 비교하였다. 모델 검증 결과, 의사결정에 대한 예측은 실제 선택과 비교했을 때 상당히 높은 수준의 정확도를 가진 것으로 확인되었다. 본 연구는 차로변경 행동에 대한 미시적 수준의 탐색을 제공함으로써 의사결정에 대한 현실적인 이해를 가능하게 한다.

서지기타정보

서지기타정보
청구기호 {DGT 24004
형태사항 viii, 167 p. : 삽도 ; 30 cm
언어 영어
일반주기 저자명의 한글표기 : 고은정
지도교수의 영문표기 : Kitae Jang
지도교수의 한글표기 : 장기태
Including appendix
학위논문 학위논문(박사) - 한국과학기술원 : 조천식모빌리티대학원,
서지주기 References : p. 144-162
주제 game theory
probabilistic payoff
lane-changing
interaction
decision-making
merging section
roundabout
travel time
passing time
게임이론
확률적 보상
차로변경
상호작용
의사결정
합류부
회전 교차로
통행시간
통과시간
QR CODE

책소개

전체보기

목차

전체보기

이 주제의 인기대출도서

Interaction between vehicles

Dissertation structureby chapter

Representative mandatory lane-changing sections

Process of lane-changing

Gap acceptance model from the ego vehicle perspective

Cooperative lane-changing model from thelagvehicle perspective

Game-theoretic model considering vehicleinteraction

Strategies of the entrant vehicle in the merging section

Strategies of the incumbent vehiclein the merging section

Starting point of the game in the merging section

Normal form ofthe payoff matrix in the merging section

Payoff matrix in the merging section

Expected trajectory ofthe entrant vehicle in the merging section

Expected trajectory of the incumbent vehicle in the merging section

Expected trajectory assuming the movement of other vehicles in the merging section

Strategy area in the merging section

Intersection pointofthe trajectories in the merging section (Forward lane changing Yield)

Intersection pointof the trajectoriesin the merging section (Backward lane- changing- Notyield)

Intersection point ofthe trajectories in the merging section (Conflict)

Numerical example in the merging section (Forward lane-changing Yield)

Trajectory range in the merging section (Forward lane-changing Yield)

Payoff matrix in the merging section (Forward lane-changingYield)

Probability of accelerationin the merging section (Forward lane- changing Yield)

Numerical example in the merging section (Forward lane-changing Yield and conflict)

Payoff matrix in the merging section (Forward lane-changing-Yield and conflict)

Probability ofacceleration in the merging section (Forward lane- changing Yield and conflict)

Numerical example in the merging section (Forward lane-changing-Yield, conflict, and Backward lane-changing Notyield)

Trajectory rangein the merging section (Forward lane-changing-Yield, conflict, and Backward lane-changing- Notyield)

Payoff matrix in the merging section (Forward lane-changing-Yield, conflict, and Backward lane-changing-Notyield)

Probability of acceleration in the merging section (Forward lane- changing Yield, conflict, and Backward lane-changing Notyield)

Range of interaction in the merging section

Speed and position by case in the merging section

Acceleration by case in the merging section

Relative driving states by case in the merging section

Maneuvering range of acceleration in the merging section

Equilibrium difference in the merging section

Strategies of the entrant vehicle in the roundabout

Starting pointof the game in the roundabout

Normal form of the payoff matrix in the roundabout

Payoff matrix in the roundabout

Expected trajectory ofthe entrant vehiclein the roundabout

Expected trajectory of the incumbent vehicle in the roundabout

Expected trajectory assuming the movement ofother vehicles in the roundabout

Example of a situation where waiting timeis reflected in the roundaboul

Example of the probabilistic conflict

Numerical example in the roundabout (clear decision)

Trajectory range in the roundabout (clear decision

Payoff matrix in the roundabout (clear decision)

Probability of acceleration in the roundabout (clear decision)

Numerical example in the roundabout (probabilistic conflict)

Trajectory range in the roundabout (probabilistic conflict)

Payoff matrix in the roundabout (probabilistic conflict)

Probability of acceleration in the roundabout (probabilistic conflict)

Range ofinteraction in the roundabout - 107 -

Acceleration by case in the roundabout

Relative driving states by case in the roundabout

Maneuvering range of acceleration in the roundabout

Equilibrium in the roundabout

Equilibrium difference in the roundabout

Procedure of data extract from aerial image (E. K0 etal.,2021)

Percentage of actual cases in the merging section

Comparison of data distribution in the merging section

Chi-square test in the merging section

Confusion matrix

Model accuracy in the merging section

Comparison of acceleration on actual data in the merging section

Map of the data collection sites of the roundabouts in Germany (sites marked

Details of data in the roundabout

Aerial views ofthe data collection sites ofthe roundabouts in Germany

Percentage of actual cases in the roundabout

Comparison of data distribution in the roundabout

Chi-square test in the roundabout

Model accuracy in the roundabout

Comparison of acceleration on actual data in the roundabout